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trary risks. It provides Pareto optimal allocationsand showsthat the zero utilitypremium
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11 Introduction
Withintheboundsof theirpossibilities, individualsgenerally trytoeliminatetherisksresulting
from their social and economic activities as much as possible. In this regard, a common way
of doing so is by means of risk sharing and/or insurance. Firms, for instance, might prefer
to cooperate in joint ventures when investing in risky projects, while investors perpetrate risk
sharing by investing their capital in a diversiﬁed portfolio of ﬁnancial assets.
In insurance, an insurance company contracts to bear (part of) an individual’s risk in
exchange for a ﬁxed payment, the insurance premium. For actuarial scientists, this insurance
premiumhas beenand still isa muchexaminedresearchtopic. Themainquestionthey address
is, what is a reasonable premium for the risk that is insured, for the insurance premium should
be acceptable with respect to the opposite interests of both the insurer and the insured.
Classical actuarialtheorymainlyconsidersthisproblemfromtheinsurer’spointofview.
In determining a reasonable insurance premium, it distinguishes between risk arising from the
‘life’ sector and risk arising from the ‘non life’ sector. For the ﬁrst, there is a profusion of
statistical data on the expected remaining life available, which makes the calculation of an
appropriatepremiumrelativelyeasy. For thelatter, however,thingsareabit morecomplicated.
In‘nonlife’insurancetheriskisnotalwayseasytocaptureinastatisticalframework. Therefore,
several premium calculation principles have been developed to serve this purpose, see for
instance Goovaerts, De Vylder and Haezendonck (1984).
These calculation principles, however, only take into account a part of the insurer’s side
of the deal. More precisely, they consider whether the premium is high enough to cover the
risk. Competitionarisingfrom the presence of other insurers on theone hand, andthe interests
of the insured, on the other hand, are mostly ignored. It is, of course, better to consider
all these aspects in an insurance deal, since the premium should not only be high enough to
compensate the insurer for bearing the individual’s risk, it should also be low enough so that
an individual is willing to insure his risk (or a part of it) for this premium. The economic
models for (re)insurance markets, which were developed from the 1960’s on (cf. Borch
(1962a) and B¨ uhlmann (1980), (1984)), consider indeed the interests of both the insurers
and the insureds. These models incorporate the possibility to study problems concerning
fairness, Pareto optimality and market equilibrium. B¨ uhlmann (1980), for example, shows
that the Esscher calculation principle results in a Pareto optimal outcome. For an overview of
economic models in insurance see Borch (1990).
Game theory is also used to model the interests of all parties in an insurance problem.
Examples can be found in Borch (1962b), Lemaire (1991), Alegre and Merc` e Claramunt
(1995),andSuijsetal.(1998). Thelatterusesstochasticcooperativegamestomodelindividual
insurance as well as reinsurance by insurance companies. The results they obtain, however,
only hold for exponentially distributed losses. This paper generalizes Suijs et al. (1998) in the
sense that itallowsarbitraryrandomlosses. We determineParetooptimalallocationsand show
2that the zero utility principle for calculating premiums (see Goovaerts et al. (1984)) yields a
core allocation.
2 Stochastic Cooperative games
Let usﬁrstrecallsomeofthedeﬁnitionsconcerningstochasticcooperativegamesasintroduced























),w h e r e
N is the set of agents,
X
S the nonempty set
of random payoffs coalition
S can obtain, and
￿
￿








) of stochastic payoffs with ﬁnite expectation. We assume that for each agent the
preferences are complete, transitive and continuous
1. The class of all cooperative games with
stochastic payoffs with agent set
































































S. The set of all allocations
for coalition













































N is a core allocation for
the game
￿ if for each coalition









































S. The set of all core allocations for













N such that for each
i
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) equals theamount of money
m for which agent
i is indifferent












) is called the certainty equivalent of
X. Condition (M1) states that agent
i weakly prefers one stochastic payoff to another one if and only if the certainty equivalent
of the former is greater than or equal to the certainty equivalent of the latter. Condition (M2)
states that the certainty equivalent is linearly separable in the deterministic amount of money





































) can be deﬁned by
1The preferences
￿























































). It is easy to check that































































































































































































































can redistribute their risks and, consequently, improve their welfare. First, we need to specify
the agents that participate in the game. An agent can be one of two types, either an individual
person or an insurer. The set of individual persons is denoted by
N
P and the set of insurers is
denoted by
N









































P. By changing the




i the utility function becomes convex, and, as a consequence,
the agent will be risk loving. Regarding the situations where one or more risk neutral/loving


























P,t h ev a r i a b l e
￿
X
i describes the random losses that could occur to
this individual. They include, for example, the monetary damages caused by cars, bikes, ﬁres,




I,t h ev a r i a b l e
￿
X













Now, let us focus on the possibilities that occur when agents decide to cooperate.
Therefore, consider a coalition
S of agents. If the members of























i. Subsequently, the loss
X
S has to be allocated to the members of
S.
In Suijs et al. (1999) an allocation of the random payoff
X
S to the members of coalition















































S. Applying this deﬁnition to
insurance games, however, raises a problem. For
X
S not only consists of the future random
losses of agent




























P transfers (part of) his
random losses to agent
i, or, put in other words, agent
j insures (part of) his random losses at
agent
i. But this is rather unusual; agents only makeinsurance deals with insurance companies
and not with other individuals. So, we need to modify our deﬁnition of an allocation so as
to incorporate transfers of random losses from individuals to insurance companies only. The














j then represents the fraction of agent
j’s random loss that he transfers to agent
i. Then by
imposing the right conditions on
R we can guarantee that individuals cannot transfer any risks
among each other.
For explaining an allocation of the loss
X
S in more detail, we distinguish between the
following three cases. In the ﬁrst case, coalition





Such a coalition is assumed to allocate the loss
X
S in the following way. First, a coalition














































1 .T h i si sc a l l e d
proportional (re)insurance. This part of the allocation of
X
S for coalition
S is described by








+ ,w h e r e
r
i
j represents the fraction insurer





















0.T h e s e
transfer payments can be interpreted as the aggregate premium insurers have to pay for the
actual risk exchanges.
In the second case, coalition





the gains of cooperation are assumed to be nil. That is, we do not allow any risk exchanges
between the persons themselves. For, that is what the insurers are for in the ﬁrst place. As a































In the third and last case, coalition








P. Now cooperation can take place in two different ways. First, insurers
5are allowed to exchange (parts of) their portfolios with other insurers, and, second, individual
personsmaytransfer(partsof)theirrisksto insurers. Again,individualpersonsarenot allowed
to exchange risks with each other. Moreover, we assume that insurers cannot transfer (parts
of) their portfolios to individuals.
Summarizing we can say that there are several restrictions on allocations. To be more
precise, denote by
S




































feasible for the coalition
















































































































4. A feasible allocation for








































































































4 pay a premium of
2 and
1, respectively, to insurer
1 for the insurance
of their losses.
In conclusion, an insurance game
































),w h e r e
N
I is the set of insurers,
N












g the random loss for coalition
S,a n d
U






















3.1 Pareto Optimal Distributions of Risk
Since the preferences of each agent are described by means of an exponential utility function,





















) provided that the expected utility exists,
6of course.
2 From Example 1 it follows that the certainty equivalent for exponential utility
functions satisﬁes the conditions (M1) and (M2). Hence, the results stated in Suijs and Borm
(1999) on certainty equivalents apply. One of these results concerns the Pareto optimality of






































is Pareto optimal for coalition
































































the sum of the certainty equivalents. To determine these allocations, we ﬁrst need to calculate















































). The random loss coalition



























































































































































































































































































2Throughout this paper we assume that the utility functions and random payoffs are such that the expected









0for Pareto optimal allocations, we have for these allocations that the
sum ofthecertaintyequivalentsisindependentofthevectoroftransferpayments
d. Intuitively,














for at least one other agent
j. Consequently, Pareto optimality is solely determined by the
choice of the allocationrisk exchange matrix
R of the random losses. In fact, the next theorem
shows that there is a unique allocation risk exchange matrix
R







































is Pareto optimal for





































































0 ,o t h e r w i s e
:
P ROOF: We have to show that
R





















































































































































S, implies that the
objective function is strictly concave. Hence, it is sufﬁcient to prove that
R
￿ is a solution of
this maximization problem. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions
3 tell us that this is indeed






















































































































L) are convex then the reverse of the statement also
holds and the maximum is unique.










































































































































































































































































































￿ is the optimal solution.
2
So, for a Pareto optimal allocation of a loss
X
j within
S one has to distinguish between
two cases. In the ﬁrst case the index























i among all insurers in coalition
S and individual
j himself. Note that by
the feasibility constraints nothing is allocated to the other individuals. Furthermore, remark





Paretooptimal allocationcoincides withthePareto optimalallocationof (re)insurancemarkets
discussed in B¨ uhlmann (1980).
The determination of the allocation risk exchange matrix is, of course, only one part
of the allocation. We still have to determine the vector of transfer payments
d, that is, the













S may be Pareto optimal
for any choice of
d, not every
d is satisfactory from a social point of view. An insurer will
not agree with insuring the losses of other agents if he is not properly compensated, that is,
if he does not receive a fair premium for the insurance. Similarly, insurance companies and
individuals only agree to insure their losses if the premium they have to pay is reasonable.
Consequently, there is a conﬂict of interests; both insurance companies and individuals want
to pay a low premiumfor insuring their own losses, while insurancecompanies want to receive
a high premium for bearing the losses of other agents.
3.2 The Zero Utility Premium Calculation Principle
Premium calculation principles indicate how to determine the premium for a certain risk. In
the past, various of these principles were designed, for example, the net premium principle,
9the expected value principle, the standard deviation principle, the Esscher principle, and the
zero utility principle (cf. Goovaerts et al. (1984). In this section we focus on the zero utility














X such that the
utility level of individual
i, who bears the risk
X, remains unchanged when the wealth
w
i of










X. Since individuals are expected utility maximizers





























). Note that the
premium of the risk
X depends on the individual who bears this risk and his wealth
w
i.
Now, let us return to insurance games and utilize the zero utility principle to determine













The exponential utility functions, however, yield that the zero utility principle is independent
of theseinitialwealths
w
























































































































) whichindeed isindependent ofthewealth
w
i. Furthermore, we can calculate the premium that agents receive for the risk they bear. For
this, recall that for the Pareto optimal allocation risk exchange matrix
R





































































0 ,o t h e r w i s e
:















j, the premium he should receive for






























































































P has to pay for insuring his loss at insurer
j equal the zero


























). Because individuals are not allowed to


















10Similarly, the premium that insurer








j, equals the premium that insurer
























). Then the premium insurer




















































































































































































































































0 is the vector of transfer payments determined by the
zero utility premium calculation principle and
R





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































where the second equality follows from Theorem 3.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Example 5 In this example all monetary amounts are stated in thousands of dollars. Consider















































































































Each insurancecompany bearstheriskofall thecarscontainedinitsinsuranceportfolio.
A car can be either one of two types. The ﬁrst type corresponds to an average saloon car with
a retail price of $
2
0, and generates relatively low losses. The second type corresponds to an
exclusive sportscar with a retail price of $
2
0
0, and generates relatively high losses. More
precisely, the monetary loss generated by a car is uniformly distributed between zero and its
retail price. Thus the expected loss of a type
1 car and a type











0 cars of type
1 and
2
5 cars of type
2.
For insurer
2 the portfolio consists of
4
0
0 cars of type
1 and
7































4 each possess one car. Individual
3’s car is of type
1
and individual
4’s car is of type
2. Individual












i denote the loss of agent
i. If all agents cooperate, the Pareto optimal risk
















































































































































































































The insurance premiumsthat theagents have to pay, arecalculated according to thezero







































































































































































































































































































). It is a straightforward




































) presented in Table 1.
Now, let us take a closer look at the changes in insurer














N is realized. In the initial situation insurer
1 bears the risk
X
1 of his own


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































) as determined bythe zero utility






































does not change when he insures a part of therisk of insurer
2. A similar argument holds when























































































The increase in insurer
































































































































The phenomenon described above is subsistent in the deﬁnition of the zero utility
principle. This means that the welfare of an insurer always remains the same when he bears
the risk of someone else in exchange for the zero utilityprinciple based premium. An increase
in welfare only arises when he transfers (a part of) his own risk to someone else.
4 Subadditivity for Collective Insurances
In the insurance games deﬁned in the previous section individual persons are not allowed to
cooperate; they cannot redistribute the risk amongst themselves. Looking at the individuals’
15behavior in everyday life, this is a justiﬁed assumption. People who want to insure themselves
against certain risks do so by contacting insurance companies, pension funds etc. We show,
however, that when this restriction is abandoned then the mere fact that risk exchanges could
take place between individuals implies that insurance companies have incentives to employ
subadditive premiums. Whether or not such risk exchanges actually do take place is not
important. As a consequence, collective insurances become cheaper for the individuals.
Let
N
P betheset of individuals. Apremiumcalculationprinciple
￿ iscalledsubadditive


































S denotes the total loss of the coalition
S. So, it is attractive for the individuals to take
a collective insurance, since this reduces the total premium they have to pay.
Next, consider a game with agent set
N
P only where the individuals are allowed to
































































































) can be interpreted
as the maximum premium coalition
S wants to pay for the insurance of the total risk
X
S.
To see this, suppose that the coalition
S can insure the loss
X






exceeds the valuation of the risk
X










































































































































































































































i (cf. expression (2))


































































). Consequently, they will not pay more for the insurance of the risk
X


































) . For totally




























In fact, we deﬁned a game that dealt with both the insurance and the reinsurance problem
simultaneously. We showed that there is only one allocation risk exchange matrix yielding
a Pareto optimal distribution of the losses and that a core allocation results when insurance
premiums are calculated according to the zero utility principle.
Recallthatinsurersdonotbeneﬁtfrominsuringtherisksoftheindividualswhenutilizing
theadditivezeroutilityprinciple; thispremiumcalculationprincipleyieldsthelowestpremium
for which insurers still want to exchange risks with the individuals (see Example 5). So, from
a social point of view, it might be best to adopt a middle course and look for premiums where
both insurers and individualsbeneﬁt from theinsurance transaction. Interestingquestions then
remaining are: are these premiums additive or subadditive and do they yield core allocations?
An issue only brieﬂy mentioned in this paper concerns the insurers’ behavior. What if
an insurer is risk neutral or risk loving instead of risk averse? Thus, thereis at least one insurer


























Although the proofs are not provided here, most of the results presented in this paper still hold
for these situations. This means that the corresponding games have nonempty cores and that
the zero utility principle still yields a core allocation. The result that does change is the Pareto
optimal allocationof therisk. The allocations that arePareto optimal when all insurers arerisk
averse are not Pareto optimal anymore when one or more insurers happen to be risk loving. In
fact, they are the worst possible allocations of the risk one can think of. In that case, allocating
all therisktothemost risklovinginsureris Paretooptimal. This wouldactuallymeanthat only
one insurance company is needed, since other insurance companies will ultimately reinsure
their complete portfolios at this most risk loving insurer.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the results presented in this paper still go through











i are mutually independent by the






















































0, is strictly concave in
x.







































































































































































c is concave. The lemma then follows from the observation that the inequality is
binding if and only if






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Thus, since (7) is a decreasing function in
x taking the value zero in
x
=
0 , it follows that (7)
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